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The Entrepreneur’s Choice: Venture Capital Debt
Financing with Adverse Selection
G. Geoffrey Booth*
Michigan State University,
Orkunt Dalgic**
State University of New York at New Paltz
and
Allan Young***
Curtin University, Perth, Western Australia
& Whitman School of Management, Syracuse University
This paper studies the consequences of using a debt contract to raise venture capital for
an entrepreneurial project in an adverse selection setting with different quality venture
capitalists. The paper considers not only the likelihood of success of a one-time project being
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dependent on the quality of the venture capitalist, but also the problem of a reduced ownership
value of future rents from the venture if the venture capitalist takes it over as the result of
default of the entrepreneur. Expressions for the face value of debt required for pooling and
separating equilibria are also derived. The existence of a separating equilibrium with bad
quality venture capitalists is used to show how less reputable venture capitalists can survive in
the marketplace. Finally, the paper uses a numerical example to demonstrate why the
entrepreneurs of more profitable entrepreneurial firms may prefer to do business with bad
quality venture capitalists.
I.

Introduction
Venture capitalists normally do considerably more than invest passively in
entrepreneurial ventures. They also offer extensive project monitoring and provide expertise
continuously through their involvement in crucial areas such as strategic decision-making,
technology assessment, market analysis, risk/return determination, and management recruiting.
In fact venture capitalists frequently provide value-added services for the emerging company
well beyond the funds they generate (Schilit, 1996). A venture capitalist‟s value to the
entrepreneurial firm therefore depends in part on the value the capitalist can bring to the
entrepreneurial firm in terms of such valued-added services. In addition, there is strong
empirical evidence to suggest that high quality added venture capitalist activities are greatly
needed, as Dorsey (1977) and Huntsman and Hoban (1980) report failure rates of 18% and 16%
respectively for companies with venture capital investments in their first five to seven years of
existence, whereas Schilit (1996) states that the success rate for all new companies is about
10% to 20%.
It is only natural to expect that the value of these added venture capitalist services
beyond providing financing would vary with the quality and experience of the venture
capitalist. Whereas the ability of the reputable venture capitalist to provide superior services of
this kind to the entrepreneur may not be in much doubt, the efficacy of younger and less
established venture capitalists in providing these services may not be as clear. Thus we may
envisage a population of young venture capital firms with an unproven track record of success,
who can provide no clear signal as to their abilities. This is supported by Gompers (1996), who
finds that younger and, therefore, less established venture capitalists bring IPOs earlier to the
market than do more reputable venture capitalists in order to signal their quality to the market
and to attract investment more easily for follow-on venture projects.
This paper examines the consequences of raising venture capital using a debt contract
when the quality of the venture capitalist is subject to adverse selection. We consider not only
the likelihood of success of a one-time project being dependent on the quality of the venture
capitalist, but also the future rents from the venture being dependent upon the project‟s
ownership after the proceeds from the one-time project are realized.
When an entrepreneur considers a young venture capitalist firm for external debt
financing, it is unable to observe the quality of the venture capitalist. One good and one bad
type of venture capitalist are considered in our model. With a good type venture capitalist, the
project of the entrepreneur has a greater chance of success than with a bad type venture
capitalist. In practice, a reputable venture capitalist belonging to the good type would
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eventually separate out to a certain degree, since her abilities would be publicly known. 1 An
adverse selection model that includes reputable venture capitalists would be uninteresting, and,
as a result, we can envisage our adverse selection model as containing only young and
inexperienced venture capital firms who can belong to what eventually will become either the
good or the bad type depending upon the number of years of their eventual existence. But why
should we study young and inexperienced venture capital firms? Gompers (1996) mentions
that it would be interesting to study why entrepreneurs do business with younger venture
capitalists who, as noted above, would likely rush them into an early IPO, rather than
contracting with older and more reputable venture capitalists who are more likely to bring
about firm value maximizing IPOs. So why would entrepreneurs who have a choice between a
reputable firm of proven skill and ability and a young firm, whose abilities are as yet unproven,
choose to do business with the latter? While the present study does not explicitly model an
entrepreneur‟s choice between older and more reputable venture capitalist firms (whose quality
is publicly known) and younger and less reputable capitalist firms, by examining the
contractual implications of an entrepreneur selecting young venture capital firms under
adversity, it derives the conditions under which bad quality venture capitalists may survive in
the market place (in a separating equilibrium).2 This in turn may help explain how less
reputable (or younger) venture capital firms can survive in the marketplace. We also use a
numerical example to explain how more profitable entrepreneurial firms may prefer to (debt)
finance their projects with bad quality venture capitalists rather than with good quality ones.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews some of the important
related literature in the area of venture capital financing. Section III discusses the setup of the
model. Section IV considers the conditions under which a pooling equilibrium might be
feasible. Section V examines separating equilibria and Section VI looks at social welfare
maximization. Section VII discusses the viability of less reputable (bad quality) venture
capitalist firms in the marketplace, and uses a numerical example to explain how
entrepreneurial firm profitability can affect the viability of such venture capitalists. Finally,
Section VIII provides concluding remarks.
II.

Literature Review
This section reviews some of the literature related to venture capitalist quality and the
quality of venture capital investments, and presents a short summary of some literature on
moral hazard problems in venture capital.
Lerner (1994) looks at the syndication of venture capital investments, and finds that
reputable venture capitalists syndicate first-round investments to venture investors with similar
levels of expertise. In later rounds, the reputable venture capitalists syndicate the venture to
both their peers, as well as to less-experienced venture capital investors. Gompers (1998) finds
that the booming market for venture-backed IPO‟s, coupled with recent reductions in the
capital gains tax-rate, led to an increase in the profitability of venture capitalism and caused
venture capitalists to dramatically increase their capital commitments to new ventures. Also, an
increase in the level of new funds raised by venture capitalists forced many of them to seek an
even greater number of venture investment opportunities, which helps explain the shift by
1

According to Gompers (1996) the age of the venture capitalist proxies for reputation, implying that disreputable
venture capitalists (belonging to a bad type) would not survive a long time in the marketplace; i.e., eventual
bankruptcy would remove a potentially disreputable venture capitalist from the market.
2
Specifically, under a debt contract.
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venture capitalists to later stage investments. Studies of the incentives of venture capitalists to
engage in value reducing behavior have concentrated on the premature abandonment decision.
Sahlman (1990) argues that premature abandonment (through an IPO) may come about due to
the fact that the venture capitalist holds a more diversified portfolio of opportunities and has a
higher opportunity cost of time (as more profitable ventures may become available) than the
entrepreneur. According to Gompers (1996), the venture capitalist may also bring about a
premature IPO in order to both signal her reputation and cause a revision of the market value of
her investments. Chevalier and Ellison (1995) find empirically, that premature IPOs allow the
venture capitalist to more easily attract new investment capital. Furthermore, Gompers (1996)
finds that the IPO‟s of younger venture capitalists suffer greater underpricing on average than
those of reputable venture capitalists.
Finally, the literature on venture capital moral hazard problems include the following:
Trester (1998) studies the incentives of the entrepreneur to steal from the project under
preferred equity and debt financing; Landskroner and Paroush (1995) show how an
entrepreneur‟s own capital investment can make the venture capitalist more willing to equityfinance the venture; Bergemann and Hege (1998) develop the optimal equity contract in a
dynamic agency setting; and Casamatta (2003) examines the joint provision of effort by the
entrepreneur and advisor (venture capitalist) to improve the productivity of the venture capital
investment.
III.

Model Setup
In this model, a risk-neutral entrepreneur who owns a firm and a one-time project,
contracts with a risk-neutral venture capitalist who provides the project with external debt
capital. The venture capitalist, the agent in this model, operates in a perfectly competitive
market for venture funding. At time 0, nature chooses the type of the venture capitalist. The
venture capitalist can be of good type with probability p, or she can be of bad type with
probability 1-p. The entrepreneur, who is the principal in this model, offers a debt contract to
the venture capitalist, while not knowing the venture capitalist‟s type. The venture capitalist
can either accept or reject the entrepreneur‟s debt contract.
If the venture capitalist accepts the contract, she is required to invest a certain amount
„I‟ in the project, as the project can only proceed if an investment of I is made. In this model,
the project returns RL if unsuccessful and RH if successful, where RH > RL. To make the
analysis clearer, RL is assumed to equal 0, with no loss of generality, and RH is more simply
denoted as R. Therefore, at time 2, if the venture capitalist is of the good type, the project will
return R with probability qG and 0 with probability 1-qG. If the venture capitalist is of the bad
type, the project will return R with probability qB and 0 with probability 1-qB. We assume
1>qG>qB>0, so that the project has a greater probability of success under the good type venture
capitalist than under the bad type.
At time 2, the project returns are realized and the venture capitalist receives a fixed
wage, W(I), if the project has been successful, meaning that there is no default (i.e., R > W(I)) ,
and obtains full ownership of the future rents of the venture if the project fails, when default
occurs with certainty.
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A timeline for the project would look as follows:
t=0
Nature chooses
venture capitalist
type
(unobserved by
entrepreneur)

t=1

t=2

Entrepreneur offers
venture capitalist a debt
contract. The project can
move forward only if the
capitalist accepts the
contract and invests „I‟ in
the venture.

Outcome of the project is realized (R or 0). If the
outcome is R, the capitalist is paid a fixed wage
W(I) and the entrepreneur continues to own the
firm. If the project returns 0, the entrepreneur
defaults with certainty and ownership of the
entrepreneurial firm goes to the venture capitalist.

The extensive form of the game is shown below, where the dashed lines denote the
entrepreneur‟s information sets and project returns are realized at these information sets. The
values „VTX‟ represent the total value of the entrepreneurial firm when the venture capitalist is
of type T and the project return is X.3

H
Good
oood

VGH

L

VGL

H

VBH

L

VBL

NATURE
Bad

The model also considers the value of future rents „Z‟ that may come as a result of the
ownership of the entrepreneurial firm. Since we are concentrating our study on a simple
adverse selection model, an assumption is made that the value of future rents is independent of
the project outcome, and dependent only on the owner of the entrepreneurial venture at time 2.
Thus:
VGH = VBH = R - I + Z,
VGL = -I + G  Z,
VBL = -I + B  Z.
We further note that 1 > G > B, meaning that the value of future rents is greater when
the venture capitalist is of the good type than when she is of the bad type, but this value is
3

Here, T denotes either G or B, and X denotes either H or L.
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greatest when the entrepreneur maintains ownership.4 Therefore, we are explicitly modeling the
impact of firm ownership on the value of the future profitability of the firm, much the same
way that we consider the impact of venture capitalist type on the chance of success of the onetime project. If the venture capitalist is of the good type and the project is successful, then
ownership of the firm remains with the entrepreneur and, consequently, the value at date 2 of
the future rents from the firm is higher than if the project were unsuccessful and the good type
of venture capitalist owned the firm. This is due to the entrepreneurial skill and knowledge
possessed by the entrepreneur (and not possessed by the venture capitalist) that add value to the
future rents of the firm. Also, if the venture capitalist is of the bad type, and the project is
unsuccessful, ownership passes to the venture capitalist, and the value of the firm‟s future rents
is strictly less than had the venture capitalist been of the good type, ceteris paribus. Therefore,
as long as ownership remains with the entrepreneur, maximum social value is preserved. This
is evident in the relationship: VGH = VBH > VGL > VBL.
Moreover, if a non-debt contract were used, the ownership of the firm would always
remain with the entrepreneur, and this would ensure the maximization of social wealth. Also,
since the entrepreneur does not observe the type of the venture capitalist at the time of
contracting, if the entrepreneur does not default, the fixed wage paid to the venture capitalist
cannot depend upon the venture capitalist‟s type. Under default, however, the venture capitalist
receives the ownership value of the future rents of the firm, and these do depend upon the
venture capitalist‟s type, through factors G and B.
In this paper, we investigate whether or not pooling and separating equilibria exist with
a debt contract as outlined above. We therefore derive the contracts the entrepreneur needs to
offer the venture capitalist, W(I). We observe that under a debt contract the entrepreneur has a
greater probability of default if she contracts with a bad type venture capitalist than if she
contracts with a good type.
IV.

Pooling Equilibrium
In this section we consider the values of W(I), the compensation for the venture
capitalist when there is no default, that gives us a pooling equilibrium, i.e., one in which both
types of venture capitalists agree to a debt investment in the entrepreneurial project.
The ex-ante expected profit for the good type venture capitalist is calculated as follows:
The project returns R, with probability qG, and the venture capitalist receives the full amount of
the compensation W(I), so the expected profit of the venture capitalist without default is:
qG (W(I) – I).
The project returns 0 with probability (1-qG), and the expected profit of the venture capitalist
with default is:
(1-qG) (G  Z – I).
Therefore, the rationality constraint implies:
G = qG (W(I) – I) + (1-qG) (G Z – I)  0.
Here G and B can be thought of as discount factors that reduce the value of future rents at time 2. In our model,
the discount factor under entrepreneurial ownership is normalized to one.
4
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Rearranging the above equation gives the participation wage, W(I), for the good type of venture
capitalist:
W(I)  ( I – (1-qG) G Z ) / qG.

(1)

The ex-ante expected profit for the bad type venture capitalist is calculated in the
following way. The project returns R, with probability qB, and the venture capitalist receives
the full amount of the compensation, W(I), so the expected profit of the venture capitalist
without default is:
qB (W(I) – I).
The project returns 0 with probability (1-qB), and the expected profit of the venture capitalist
with default is:
(1-qB) (B  Z – I).
Thus the ex-ante profit at date 0 for the bad type of venture capitalist is:
B = qB (W(I) – I) + (1-qB) (B Z – I)  0.
Similarly, rearranging the above equation gives the participation wage, W(I), for the bad type
of venture capitalist:
W(I)  ( I – (1-qB) B Z ) / qB.

(2)

We know that G > B, since future rents are assumed to be greater under a good type
venture capitalist than under a bad one. We also know that q G > qB. Therefore, a pooling
equilibrium exists if both types of venture capitalists break even in equilibrium. This implies
that equations (1) and (2) hold with equality. Hence, in order to have participation from both
types of venture capitalists in equilibrium, the entrepreneur must offer a wage:
W(I) = Max (W1(I), W2(I)),
where W1(I) refers to W(I) in equation1), and W2(I) refers to W(I) in equation (2).
We can now maximize the objective function, i.e., the expected wealth of the
entrepreneur in a pooling equilibrium with respect to W(I):
E = pqG (R + Z - W(I)) + (1-p)qB (R + Z - W(I) ) + p(1-qG)( 0 ) + (1-p)(1-qB) ( 0 )
= (pqG + (1-p)qB)  (R + Z – W(I))
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subject to the venture capitalist‟s constraint,
W(I) = Max (W1(I), W2(I)),
and the entrepreneur‟s rationality constraint,
(pqG + (1-p)qB)  (R + Z – W(I))  Z,
which yields
W(I)



R – Z [ ( 1 - (pqG + (1-p)qB) ) / (pqG + (1-p)qB) ].

In equilibrium, since W(I) satisfies the rationality constraint of the entrepreneur, R >
W(I) (the condition which ensures that no default occurs when the project is successful), and Z
 0 (the future rents that the entrepreneur receives), the expected wealth of the entrepreneur is
maximized when W(I) is minimized. Thus, in a pooling equilibrium, the wage offered by the
entrepreneur must satisfy the following expression:
W(I) = Max(W1(I), W2(I) ) 

R – Z [ ( 1 - (pqG + (1-p)qB)) / (pqG + (1-p)qB) ].

We also observe that this pooling equilibrium is only Nash when W(I) = W 1(I) = W2(I).
Thus if W1(I)  W2(I), the pooling equilibrium breaks down, and the entrepreneur chooses to
offer the venture capitalist the lower of the two wages W1(I) or W2(I), which maximizes the
entrepreneur‟s wealth function. There is another pooling equilibrium in which neither one of
the two venture capitalist types participate in the project, but it is easy to see that this
equilibrium is Nash only when the entrepreneur‟s participation constraint is not satisfied. This
pooling equilibrium will exist if and only if
(pqG + (1-p)qB)  (R + Z – W(I)) < Z,
where W(I) = min (W1(I), W2(I)). Otherwise, the entrepreneur always wants to pursue
the project and this second pooling equilibrium breaks down.
V.

Separating Equilibria
In the previous section we considered the conditions under which a pooling equilibrium
exists in an adverse selection setting. Here we consider the conditions under which separating
equilibria may exist. If W2(I) > W1(I), then in equilibrium the entrepreneur offers a wage W(I)
= W1(I) in return for an initial investment of „I’ by the venture capitalist. This implies that only
the good type venture capitalist will accept the contract.
The wealth of the entrepreneur given that only the good type venture capitalist accepts
the contract is:
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E|G = qG (R + Z – W1(I)) + (1-qG)( 0 )
= qG (R + Z – W1(I) ).
In order for the separating equilibrium to exist with only the good type venture capitalist
accepting the contract, we must have:
W(I) = W1(I) < W2(I)
and
qG (R + Z – W1(I) )  Z

(to satisfy the rationality constraint of the entrepreneur).

Since the wage W(I) = W1(I) does not satisfy the participation constraint of the bad type venture
capitalist in equilibrium, only the good type venture capitalist accept the contract. Therefore,
we have a separating equilibrium in which only the good type venture capitalist provides debt
capital to the entrepreneurial firm. Similarly if W1(I) > W2(I), then the entrepreneur offers a
wage W(I) = W2(I) in return for an initial investment of „I’ by the venture capitalist. This
implies that only the bad type venture capitalist accepts the debt contract offered by the
entrepreneur. The wealth of the entrepreneur given that only the bad type venture capitalist
accepts the contract is:
E|B = qB (R + Z – W1(I) ) + (1-qB) ( 0 )
= qB (R + Z – W2(I) ).
In order for the separating equilibrium to exist with only the bad type venture capitalist
accepting the contract, we must have:
W(I) = W2(I) < W1(I)
and
qB (R + Z – W2(I) )  Z

(to satisfy the rationality constraint of the entrepreneur).

VI.

Maximizing Social Wealth
The ex-ante social wealth in a pooling equilibrium provided the project is undertaken is
given by:
SW = pqG VGH + (1-p)qBVBH + p(1-qG)VGL + (1-p)(1-qB)VBL
= (pqG + (1-p)qB)  (R + Z) + [ p(1-qG)  G + (1-p)(1-qB)  B ] Z - I.
Since qG>qB and G > B, we can see that SW is maximized when p=1, i.e., when only the
good type venture capitalist supplies debt financing. This implies that if W 2(I) > W1(I), the
social wealth of the firm is maximized. Therefore, social wealth is not maximized under a
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pooling equilibrium where both types of venture capitalists participate. This happens in a
separating equilibrium in which the entrepreneur offers a wage W(I) = W 1(I) < W2(I), which
only the good type venture capitalist accepts.
VII.

Discussion
The preceding analysis shows that under certain conditions, an entrepreneur may prefer
to offer a contract to a bad quality venture capitalist (the second separating equilibrium). In
order to better understand the different equilibrium outcomes, we plot in Figure 1 the
participation wages for both bad and good venture capitalists against the future profitability of
the firm (i.e. future rents, Z) for a given numerical example. The parameter values used for the
numerical example are, I=20, R=100, qG =0.8, qB=0.5, G = 0.8, B=0.5. As can be seen from
Figure 1, the reservation wages required by the good and bad venture capitalists, W 1 and W2,
respectively, decrease at different rates as the future profitability of the firm (Z) increases, and
are equal when Z=50. Since the entrepreneur can maximize her payoff by choosing to pay the
lower of the two wages, this implies that for values of Z less than 50 the entrepreneur pays a
wage W1<W2, which only the good quality venture capitalist accepts (good separating
equilibrium), for Z=50 the entrepreneur pays a wage W1=W2 which is accepted by both good
and bad venture capitalists (pooling equilibrium), and for Z>50 the entrepreneur pays a wage
W2<W1 accepted only by the bad quality venture capitalist (bad separating equilibrium).5 Thus,
as the future profitability of the firm, Z, increases, the entrepreneur finds it increasingly more
attractive to choose the bad quality venture capitalist. The reason for this is that under a bad
quality venture capitalist, the project is less likely to be successful (i.e. qB<qG) and the bad
quality venture capitalist will therefore be more likely to take over the firm. This means that
when the firm has greater future profits, Z, the bad quality venture capitalist benefits more from
the project than does the good quality venture capitalist, and therefore when the firm has
sufficient future profitability, the bad quality venture capitalist requires a smaller wage than
does the good quality one. Therefore, the example shows that with a debt contract more
profitable ventures may be more likely to be funded by bad quality venture capitalists.
The more general implication of this analysis is that it is possible to have only bad
quality venture capitalists operating in the venture capital market. This is consistent with the
finding of Gompers (1996) that IPOs performed by younger venture capitalists have greater
underpricing, such that this underpricing may represent the reaction of an efficient market to
IPOs of venture capitalists more likely to be of bad quality. Furthermore, the analysis indicates
that entrepreneurs may not necessarily prefer venture capitalists that can maximize the success
of a project and thus IPO proceeds (the good quality venture capitalists), if those venture
capitalists are too expensive, i.e. if the good quality venture capitalists require higher wages
than the bad quality ones (W1> W2). This also helps explain why in the presence of more
established venture capital firms, entrepreneurs may prefer to do business with lesser known,
and possibly bad quality venture capital firms. In any case, the analysis indicates that bad
quality venture capitalists may not necessarily disappear from the market due to natural
selection, as Gompers (1996) implies.

5

For the values used in the numerical example, the rationality constraint of the entrepreneur was satisfied under
both the bad and good venture capitalists. Thus, the entrepreneur could choose to pay the venture capitalist
whatever wage maximized the entrepreneur‟s payoff (the smaller of W 1 and W2).
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VIII. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the problem of debt contracting in an adverse selection
environment involving an entrepreneur who plans to finance a project using venture debt
capital. We find that a pooling equilibrium under which both good and bad types of venture
capitalists participate requires that the „fixed‟ wages satisfying the rationality constraint of both
types of venture capitalist be equal. When the rationality constraint satisfying wages are not
equal, the pooling equilibrium breaks down and one of two separating equilibria obtain. The
social wealth maximizing equilibrium is a separating one under which only the good type of
venture capitalist provides debt capital to the entrepreneurial project. Furthermore, the
existence of a separating equilibrium with bad quality venture capitalists is used to explain the
survival of less reputable venture capital firms in the marketplace. Finally, a numerical example
demonstrates how the entrepreneurs of more profitable ventures may prefer to do business with
bad quality venture capitalists.
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Figure 1
Future Firm Profitability and Entrepreneur's Choice of Venture Capitalist
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Note: The parameter values used for this example are: investment (I) = 20, project return (R) = 100, probability of
project success under good quality venture capitalist (q G) = 0.8, probability of project success under bad quality
venture capitalist (qB) = 0.5, discount factor for good quality venture capitalist (G) = 0.8, discount factor for bad
quality venture capitalist (B) = 0.5.

